Directive on Security Screening

Ensures that security screening in the Government of Canada is conducted in a way that is effective, rigorous, consistent and fair, and enables greater transferability of security screening between departments.
Date modified: 2025-01-07

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Appendix D: Mandatory Procedures for Collective Evaluation of Security Screening Activities

D.1 Effective date

  • D.1.1These procedures take effect on January 6, 2025.

D.2 Procedures

  • D.2.1These procedures provide details on the requirements set out in subsections 4.1.1.1.2 and 4.6.1 of the Directive on Security Screening.
  • D.2.2Mandatory procedures are as follows:

    Identity verification

    • D.2.2.1Administratively cancel the security screening process when identity information cannot be verified, despite reasonable and demonstrable effort.

    Canadian citizenship verification

    • D.2.2.2Administratively cancel the security screening process when Canadian citizenship cannot be verified, despite reasonable and demonstrable effort, for Top Secret and Enhanced Top Secret security clearance.

    Collective evaluation of security screening activities

    • D.2.2.3Collectively evaluate the results of security screening activities:
      • D.2.2.3.1Based on:
        • D.2.2.3.1.1The quality, quantity, relevance, credibility and totality of the information available relative to the level of status or clearance being considered;
        • D.2.2.3.1.2The contextual factors associated with the position, contract or other arrangement, including the totality of information related to the individual; and
        • D.2.2.3.1.3Consider as a factor the presence of adverse information and information obtained through a resolution of doubt;
      • D.2.2.3.2To assess:
        • D.2.2.3.2.1 The reliability of an individual, including their honesty and trustworthiness, based on whether they can be trusted to:
          1. Safeguard information and assets, including IT systems and facilities;
          2. Be relied upon to not abuse the level of trust accorded;
          3. Perform the assigned duties in a manner that will reflect positively on the Government of Canada; and
          4. Not pose a security risk to the Government of Canada;
        • D.2.2.3.2.2 Loyalty to Canada, as applicable, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
          1. The individual has engaged, is engaged, may engage or may be induced to engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act; or
          2. In so far as it relates to reliability as it relates to loyalty:
            1. The individual has acted, is acting, may act or may be induced to act in a way that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada; or
            2. The individual has disclosed, may disclose, may be induced to disclose or may cause to be disclosed sensitive information in a manner contrary to the public interest;
          • D.2.2.3.2.2.1Consider the presence of information that supports the likelihood of these scenarios as the basis to deny a security clearance or Site Access clearance;
          • D.2.2.3.2.2.2Consider the absence of adverse information pursuant to a CSIS security assessment as a factor in favour of whether to grant a security clearance or Site Access clearance; and
          • D.2.2.3.2.2.3Consider insufficient information required for the CSIS security assessment as grounds upon which to deny a security clearance or Site Access clearance;

    Identification and assessment of adverse information

    • D.2.2.4Assess the significance of adverse information based on the specific details of that information and in light of the totality of an individual’s circumstances, including:
      1. Mitigating and aggravating factors;
      2. The nature of the adverse information;
      3. The frequency of the adverse information;
      4. The circumstances surrounding the adverse information, including;
        1. The impact of socio-economic and cultural factors as identified by the individual;
      5. The severity of the adverse information;
      6. The passage of time;
      7. The duties to be performed;
      8. Whether the individual has been forthcoming about the information; and
      9. The remedial action and rehabilitation efforts of the individual;
    • D.2.2.5Where an Internet inquiry uncovers potential adverse findings, before rendering a decision, provide the individual with the opportunity to:
      • D.2.2.5.1Review a summary of the potential adverse findings; and
      • D.2.2.5.2Explain the findings;
    • D.2.2.6Deny a security status or clearance to an individual who cannot hold public office, contract or receive benefits under a contract pursuant to sections 750(2) and 750(3) of the Criminal Code;

    Review and reporting of adverse information

    • D.2.2.7Review adverse information as a basis for further investigation, including a resolution-of-doubt interview; and
    • D.2.2.8Where the security screening function involves the provision of services to client departments, report adverse information to the chief security officer of the client department considering employment, appointment, contract or other arrangement, or assignment of the individual.

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